Chinese spies targeted political staffers in a bid to influence Canadian elections, revealed a secret federal memo. Among those included aides who express no strong views on China.
The document from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service explained how political staff are co-opted as “gatekeepers” for MPs and senators, reported Blacklock’s Reporter.
“The People’s Republic of China targets political staffers,” said the September 8, 2021, memo. “Staffers control schedules and often act as ‘gatekeepers’ for their employers,” it reads.
The nine-page memo, disclosed by the Foreign Interference Commission, explained that staff in positions to clandestinely and deceptively influence elected and appointed officials can bend the knee in support of Chinese or Communist Party interests.
Bo Basler, former CSIS exec, tells the Foreign Interference Commission of a new instance of foreign meddling.
A former parliamentarian is suspected of working on behalf of a foreign state to influence legislative outcomes in Canada. pic.twitter.com/n8jBJqm3wH
— Sheila Gunn Reid (@SheilaGunnReid) September 30, 2024
“This occurs in many ways such as ensuring specific community groups are not seen or responded to, framing talking points to reflect Party narratives or holding public events at specific locations of interest to China e.g. a business owned by a People’s Republic proxy or a culturally significant location such as a city hall or legislative building,” said the memo People’s Republic Of China Foreign Interference In Canada: A Critical National Security Threat.
The memo also suggested that aides targeted by foreign operatives were not outspoken friends of China in all cases. China categorized individuals into three groups: supporters, those who can be swayed, and those firmly opposed.
“Foreign interference activities often transcend party lines, ideologies and ethnic backgrounds and often take place over a period of several years,” wrote CSIS. Intelligence officials wrote Chinese actors are “largely pragmatic” and tend to pursue “paths of least resistance.”
“China will seek to co-opt those who do not openly oppose or speak out against China or the Party and convince them to adopt China-friendly positions … e.g. raising human rights concerns about China, traveling to Taiwan in an official capacity, etcetera,” said National Security Threat.
“When an issue comes up in the House of Commons related to the Canada-China relations or conflicts between these two countries, why are our MPs from those ethnic background kept silent? That is something we ask them.” pic.twitter.com/APLZOzS5sA
— Sheila Gunn Reid (@SheilaGunnReid) October 2, 2024
China also tried swaying MP votes condemning their mistreatment of Muslims, testimony at the Foreign Interference Commission revealed.
Documents tabled by CSIS revealed Beijing made “initial” efforts to influence an unspecified number of MPs. In particular, when it came to a 2021 motion recognizing the country’s treatment of Uyghur and Turkic Muslim minorities as “genocide.”
While the House of Commons motion passed unanimously, Beijing built “profiles” on MPs who supported the motion. “This research may have informed the PRC’s decision to impose economic sanctions on some of those MPs or may have informed other actions,” reads a summary of intelligence.
The May 31, 2021, brief revealed then Conservative MP Kenny Chiu and MP Michael Chong were the target of Chinese interference.
WATCH: A reporter grills Justin Trudeau on why Canada’s Parliament can say China is committing genocide against its Uyghur population, but he won’t.
After stalling, Trudeau says “designations of genocide need to be made by proper international authorities.” pic.twitter.com/GuhwCF8esK
— Rebel News (@RebelNewsOnline) November 14, 2022
National Security Threat mentioned that no country came close to matching China’s stealth in surveillance and espionage. “China’s foreign interference activities in Canada continue to be sophisticated, pervasive and persistent,” it said.
“To conduct these threats the Chinese Communist Party leverages a range of Party, government and non-government assets,” wrote analysts.
“China is unique in how it conducts such activities,” said the report. “It uses a complex array of both overt and covert mechanisms to achieve its goals.”
“China is the foremost perpetrator of foreign interference activity. … The primary goal … is to further Party and state interests in a manner that protects and enhances the legitimacy and stability of the Chinese Communist Party domestically and abroad.”